In this paper, we propose and analyze the properties of a new class of games -the network congestion game (NCG), which is a generalization of the classical congestion game (CG). In a classical congestion game, multiple users share the same set of resources and a user's payoff for using any resource is a function of the total number of users sharing it. This game enjoys some very appealing properties, including the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and that every improvement path is finite and leads to such a NE (also called the finite improvement property or FIP). On the other hand, it does not model well spectrum sharing and spatial reuse in a wireless network, where resources (interpreted as channels) may be reused without increasing congestion provided that users are located far away from each other. This motivates to study an extended form of the congestion game where a user's payoff for using a channel is a function of the number of its interfering users sharing that channel, rather than the total number of users using the channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we present a generalized form of the class of non-coopertive strategic games known as congestion games (CG) [1] , [2] , and study its properties as well as its application to spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network. In a classical congestion game, multiple users share multiple resources. The payoff 1 for any user to use a particular resource depends on the number of users using that resource concurrently.
A detailed and formal description is provided in Section II. The congestion game framework is well suited to model resource competition where the resulting payoff is a function of the level of congestion (number of active users). It has been extensively studied within the context of network routing, see for instance the congestion game studied in [5] 2 , where source nodes seek minimum delay path to a destination and the delay of a link depends on the number of flows going through that link.
A congestion game enjoys many nice properties. For example, it always has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE), and any asynchronous improvement path is finite and will lead to a pure strategy NE (referred to as the finite improvement property (FIP). In fact, while the system is decentralized and all players are selfish, by seeking to optimize their individual objectives they end up optimizing a global objective, also called the potential function, and doing so in a finite number of steps regardless of the updating sequence.
For these reasons, it is tempting to model resource competition in a wireless communication system as a congestion game. However, the standard congestion game fails to capture a critical aspect of resource sharing in wireless communication: interference. A key assumption underlying the congestion game model is that all users have an equal impact on the congestion, and therefore all that matters is the total number of users of a resource. This however is not true in wireless communication. Specifically, if we consider bandwidth or channels as resources, then sharing the same channel is complicated by interference; a user's payoff (e.g., channel quality, achievable rates, etc.) depends on who the other users are and how much interference it receives from them. If all other simultaneous users are located sufficiently far away, then sharing may not cause any performance degradation, a feature commonly known as spatial reuse.
The above consideration poses significant challenge in using the congestion game model depending on what type of user objectives we are interested in. In our recent work [13] , we addressed the user- 1 Sometimes people consider the cost of using a resource instead of the payoff. If we define the cost as the inverse of the payoff, then maximizing the payoff is equivalent to minimizing the cost. For simplicity of presentation, we will focus on the maximization of payoff in this paper. 2 Note that while also called "network congestion game", the game studied in [5] is essentially a classical congestion game with resources being links in a network. By contrast, the network congestion game defined in this paper is a network game meaning that the relationship among players are given by a network. specific interference issue within the congestion game framework, by introducing a concept called resource expansion, where we define virtual resources as certain spectral-spatial unit that allows us to capture pair-wise interference. This approach was shown to be quite effective for user objectives like interference minimization.
In this paper, we take a different approach where we generalize the standard congestion games to directly account for the interference relationship and spatial reuse in wireless networks. Specifically, under this generalization, users are placed over a network representing an interference graph. An edge exists between two users that interfere with each other. In using a resource (a wireless channel), a user's payoff is a function of the total number of users within its interference neighborhood using it.
Therefore, resources are reusable beyond a user's interference set. This extension is a generalization of the original congestion game definition, as the former reduces to the latter if the underlying network is complete (i.e., every user interferes with every other user). This class of generalized games will be referred to as network congestion games (NCG).
The applicability of this class of games to a multi-channel, multi-user wireless communication system can be easily understood. Specifically, we consider such a system where a user can only access one channel at a time, but can switch between channels. A user's principal interest lies in optimizing its own performance objective (i.e., its data rate) by selecting the best channel for itself. This and similar problems have recently captured increasing interest from the research community, particularly in the context of cognitive radio networks (CRN) and software defined ratio (SDR) technologies, whereby devices are expected to have far greater flexibility in sensing channel availability/condition and moving operating frequencies.
While directly motivated by resource sharing in a multi-channel, multi-user wireless communication system, the definition of a NCG is potentially more broadly applicable. It simply reflects the notion that in some application scenarios resources may be shared without conflict of interest. In subsequent sections we will examine what properties this class of games possesses. Our main findings are summarized as follows for undirected network graphs and non-increasing payoff functions:
1) The FIP property is preserved in an NCG with only two resources/channels. Counter examples exist for three or more resources.
2) A pure strategy NE exists in a NCG over a tree network and a loop. 4 3) A pure strategy NE exists when there is either a dominating resource (a channel with much larger bandwidth than the rest) or when all resources are identical (all channels are equal).
Furthermore, in the latter case the FIP also exists.
In addition, we also show that an NE does not in general exist if the network graph is directed (meaning that the interference relationship between users is asymmetric), or that the user payoff functions are non-monotonic.
It has to be mentioned that game theoretic approaches have often been used to devise effective decentralized solutions to a multi-agent system. Within the context of wireless communication networks and interference modeling, different classes of games have been studied. An example is the well-known Gaussian interference game [6] , [12] . In a Gaussian interference game, a player can spread a fixed amount of power arbitrarily across a continuous bandwidth, and tries to maximize its total rate in a Gaussian interference channel over all possible power allocation strategies. It has been shown [6] that it has a pure strategy NE, but the NE can be quite inefficient; playing a repeated game can improve the performance. In addition, previous work [7] investigated a market based power control mechanism via supermodularity, while previous work [10] studied the Bayesian form of the Gaussian interference game in the case of incomplete information. By contrast, in our problem the total power of a user is not divisible, and it can only use it in one channel at a time. This setup is more appropriate for scenarios where the channels have been pre-defined, and the users do not have the ability to access multiple channels simultaneously (which is the case with many existing devices).
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section II we present a brief review on the literature of congestion games, and formally define the class of network congestion games in Section III. We then derive conditions under which this class of games possesses the finite improvement property (Section IV). We further show a series of conditions, on the underlying network graph in Section V and on the user payoff function in Section VI, under which these games have a pure strategy NE. We discuss extensions to our work and conclude the paper in VII. 5 
II. A REVIEW OF CONGESTION GAMES
In this section we provide a brief review on the definition of congestion games and their known properties 3 . We then discuss why the standard congestion game does not take into account spatial reuse and motivate our generalized network congestion games.
A. Congestion Games
Congestion games [1] , [2] are a class of strategic games given by the tuple (I, R,
where I = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a set of users, R = {1, 2, · · · , R} a set of resources, Σ i ⊂ 2 R the strategy space of player i, and g r : N → Z a payoff (or cost) function associated with resource r. The payoff (cost) g r is a function of the total number of users using resource r and in general assumed to be non-increasing (non-decreasing). A player in this game aims to maximize (minimize) its total payoff (cost) which is the sum total of payoff (cost) over all resources its strategy involves.
If we denote by σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ N ) the strategy profile, where σ i ∈ Σ i , then user i's total payoff (cost) is given by
where n r (σ) is the total number of users using resource r under the strategy profile σ, with and r ∈ σ i denoting that user i selects resource r under σ.
Rosenthal's potential function φ :
where the second equality comes from exchanging the two sums and m i r (σ) denotes the number of players who use resource r under strategy σ and whose corresponding indices do not exceed i (i.e., in the set {1, 2, · · · , i}).
Next we show that the change in a user's payoff as a results off its unilateral move (i.e., all other users stay put) is exactly the same as the change in the potential, which may be viewed as a global objective function. Consider player i, who unilaterally moves from strategy σ i (within the profile σ) to strategy σ ′ i (within the profile σ ′ ). The potential changes by
where the second equality comes from the fact that for resources that are used by both strategies σ i and σ ′ i there is no change in their total number of users. To see why the first equality is true, set i = N, in which case this equality is a direct consequence of the change of sums equation (2) . To see why this is true for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N, simply note that the ordering of users is arbitrary so any user making a change may be viewed as the Nth user.
Consider now a sequence of strategy changes made by users asynchronously in which each change improves the user's payoff (this is referred to as a sequence of improvement steps). The above result shows that upon each such change the potential also improves. Since the potential of any strategy profile is finite, it follows that every sequence of improvement steps is finite, and they converge to a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. This is known as the finite improvement property (FIP). Furthermore, this NE is a local optimal point of the potential function φ, defined as a strategy profile where changing one coordinate cannot result in a greater value of φ.
It is not difficult to see why the standard definition of a congestion game does not capture the features of wireless communication. In particular, if we consider channels as resources, then the payoff g r (n) for using channel r when there are n simultaneous users does not reflect reality: the function g r (·) in general takes a user-specific argument since different users experience different levels of interference even when using the same resource. This user specificity is also different from that studied in [3] , where g r (·) is a user-specific function g i r (·) but it takes the non-user specific argument n. To analyze and understand the consequence of this difference, we would need to extend and generalize the definition of the standard congestion game.
For the rest of this paper, the term player or user specifically refers to a pair of transmitter and receiver in the network. Interference in this context is between one user's transmitter and another user's receiver. This is commonly done in the literature, see for instance [6] . We will also assume that each player has a fixed transmit power.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we formally definite our generalized congestion game, the network congestion games (NCG). Specifically, a NCG is given by (I, R, (Σ i ) i∈I , {K i } i∈I , {g i r } r∈R,i∈I ), where K i is the interference set of user i, excluding itself, while all other elements maintain the same meaning as in a standard CG. The payoff user i receives for using resource r is given by g i r (n i r (σ) + 1) where n i r (σ) = |{j : r ∈ σ j , j ∈ K i }|. That is, user i's payoff for using r is a (user-specific) function of the number of users interfering with itself, plus itself. Here we have explicitly made the payoff functions user-specific, as evidenced by the index i in g i r (·). This is done in an attempt to capture the fact that users with different coding/modulation schemes may obtain different rates from using the same channel.
A user's payoff is the sum of payoffs from all the resources it uses. Note that if a user is allowed to simultaneously use all available resources, then its best strategy is to simply use all of them regardless of other users, provided that g i r is a non-negative function. If all users are allowed such a strategy, then the existence of an NE is trivially true.
In this paper, we will limit our attention to the case where each user is allowed only one channel at a time, i.e., its strategy space Σ i ∈ R consists of R single channel strategies. In this case the payoff user i receives for using a single channel r is given by g i r (n i r + 1) where n i r (σ) = |{j : r = σ j , j ∈ K i }|. Our goal is to identify key properties of this game.
It's worth noting that due to this generalization, Rosenthal's definition of a potential function as given in the previous section no longer applies. To slightly simplify this problem, we make the extra assumption that i ∈ K j if and only if j ∈ K i . This has the intuitive meaning that if node i interferes with node j, the reverse is also true. This symmetry does not always hold in reality, but is nonetheless a useful one to help us obtain meaningful insight. It is easy to see that we can equivalently represent a more general problem on the following directed graph, where a node represents a user and a directed edge connects node i to node j if and only if i ∈ K j . The network congestion game can now be stated as a coloring problem, where each node picks a color and receives a value depending on the conflict (number of same colors neighboring to a node); the goal is to see whether an NE exists and whether a decentralized selfish scheme leads to an NE. For the special case that we consider in this paper, the graph is undirected, where there is an undirected edge between nodes i and j if and only
For simplicity of exposition, in subsequent sections we will often present the problem in its coloring version, and will use the terms resource, channel, and color interchangeably.
IV. EXISTENCE OF THE FINITE IMPROVEMENT PROPERTY
In this section we investigate whether the network congestion game as defined in the previous section possesses the FIP property. Once a game has the FIP, it immediately follows that it has an NE as we described in Section II. Below we show that in the case of two resources (colors) this game indeed has the FIP property, and as a result an NE exists. We also show through a counter example that for the case of 3 or more colors the FIP property does not hold. This also implies that in such cases an exact potential function does not exist for this game, as the FIP is a direct consequence of the existence of a potential function.
A. The Finite Improvement Property for 2 resources
We shall establish this result by a contradiction argument. Suppose that we have a sequence of asynchronous 4 updates that starts and ends in the exact same color assignment (or state) for all users.
We denote such a sequence by
where u(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the user making the change at time t, and T is the length of this sequence. The starting state (or the color choice) of the system is given by
where s i (1) ∈ {r, b}, i.e., the state of each user is either "r" for Red, or "b" for Blue. A user's state of color is defined for time t − , i.e., right before a color change is made by some user at time t. In other words, s i (t) denotes the color of user i at time t − . Since there are only two colors, we use the notations to denote the opposite color of a color s. The states after the last round of change at time
T is denoted by S(T ).
Since this sequence of updates form a loop, i.e., S(1 − ) = S(T ), we can naturally view these updates as being placed around a circle, starting at time 1 − and ending at T , when the system returns to its original state. This is shown in Figure 1 . Note that traversing the circle starting from any point results in an improvement path; hence the notion of a starting point becomes inconsequential.
Since this sequence of updates is an improvement path, each change must increase the payoff of the user making the change 5 . For example, suppose user i changes from red to blue at time t, and i has x red neighbors and y blue neighbors at t 6 . Then we must have:
Similarly, we can obtain one inequality for each of the T changes. Our goal is to show that these T
inequalities cannot be consistent with each other. The challenge here is that this contradiction has to hold for arbitrary non-increasing functions {g i r , g i b }. The way we address this challenge is to show that the above inequality leads to another inequality that does not involve the payoff functions when we consider pairs of reverse changes by the same user. This is shown in Lemma 1.
Definition 1 (Reverse-change pairs):
Consider an arbitrary user i's two reverse strategy/color changes in an improvement path, one from s tos at time t and the other froms to s at time t ′ . Let SS i t,t ′ denote the set of i's neighbors (not including i) who have the same color as i at both times of change (i.e., at t − and t ′− , respectively).
Let OO i t,t ′ denote the set of i's neighbors (not including i) who have the opposite color as i at both times of change. Similarly, we will denote by SO i t,t ′ (respectively OS i t,t ′ ) the number of i's neighbors whose color is the same as (opposite of, respectively) i's at the first update and the opposite of (same as, respectively ) i's at the second update.
Lemma 1: (Reverse-change inequality) Consider the network congestion game defined in the previous section with non-increasing payoff functions and two resources/colors. Suppose an arbitrary user i makes two reverse strategy/color changes in an improvement path, one from s tos at time t and the other froms to s at time t ′ . Then we have
5 Here we assume that a user only makes a change if there is strict increase in its payoff. 6 Since the users update their strategies in an asynchronous fashion, x and y do not change between t − and t + .
That is, among i's neighbors, there are strictly more users that have the same color as i at both times of change than those with the opposite color as i at both times of change.
Proof: Since this is an improvement path, whenever i makes a change it is for higher payoff.
Thus we must have at the time of its first change and its second change, respectively, the following inequalities:
We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the statement is not true and that we have
Then due to the non-increasing assumption on the payoff functions we have
where the second inequality is due to (8). However, this contradicts with (9), completing the proof.
We point out that by the above lemma the payoff comparison is reduced to counting different sets of users. This greatly simplifies the process of proving the main theorem of this section. Below we show that it is impossible to have a finite sequence of asynchronous improvement steps ending in the same color state as it started with. At the heart of the proof is the repeated use of the above lemma to show that loops cannot form in a sequence of asynchronous updates.
Theorem 1:
Consider the network congestion game defined in the previous section with nonincreasing payoff functions. For the special case when there are only two resources/colors to choose from and a user can only use one at a time, we have the finite improvement property.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. As illustrated by Figure 1 , we consider a sequence of improvement updates that results in the same state.
Consider every two successive color changes, along this circle clockwise starting from time t = 1, that a user u(t) makes at time t and t ′ from color s = s u(t) (t) tos, and then back to s, respectively.
Note that this will include the two "successive" changes formed by a user's last change and its first change (successive on this circle but not in terms of time). We have illustrated this in Figure 1 by connecting a pair of successive color changes using an arrow. It is easy to see that there are altogether T such pairs (or arrows).
For each arrow in Figure 1 , or equivalently each pair of successive color changes by the same user, we consider the two sets SS u(t) t,t ′ and OO u(t) t,t ′ in Definition 1. Due to the user association, we will also refer to these sets as perceived by user u(t). By Lemma 1, given an updating sequence with the same starting and ending states, we have for each pair of successive reverse changes by the same user, at time t and time t ′ , respectively:
That is, the SS sets are strictly larger than the OO sets.
This gives us a total of T inequalities, one for each update in the sequence and each containing two sets. Equivalently there is one inequality per arrow illustrated in Figure 1 . We next consider how many users are in each of these 2T sets (note that by keeping the same ">" relationship, the SS sets are always on the LHS of these inequalities and the OO sets are always on the RHS). To do this, we will examine users by pairs -we will take a pair of users and see how many times they appear in each other's sets in these inequalities. In Claim 1 below, we show that they collectively appear the same number of times in the LHS sets and in the RHS sets. We then enumerate all user pairs. What this result says is that these users collectively contribute to an equal number of times to the LHS and RHS of the set of inequalities given in Eqn. (12). Adding up all these inequalities, this translates to the fact that the total size of the sets on the LHS and those on the RHS must be equal.
This however contradicts the strict inequality, thus completing the proof.
Claim 1: Consider a pair of users A and B in an improvement updating loop, and consider how they are perceived in each other's set. Then A and B collectively appear the same number of times in the LHS sets (the SS sets) and in the RHS sets (the OO sets).
Proof: First note that A and B have to be in each other's interference set for them to appear in each other's SS and OO sets. Since we are only looking at two users and how they appear in each other's sets, without loss of generality we can limit our attention to a subsequence of the original updating sequence involving only A and B, given by
where u(t j ) ∈ {A, B}, t j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T }, and l is the length of this subsequence, i.e., the total number of updates between A and B. As before, this subsequence can also be represented clockwise along a circle.
It helps to consider an example of such a sequence, say, ABAABBABAA, also shown in Figure   2 . In what follows we will express an odd train as the odd number of consecutive changes of one user sandwiched between the other user's changes, e.g., the odd train ABA in the above subsequence. To avoid ambiguity, we will further write this sequence as
A few things to note about such a sequence:
1) Since the starting and ending states are the same, each user must appear an even number of times in the sequence. Since each user appears an even number of times, there must be an even number of odd trains along the circle for any user. 3) Consider the collection of all relevant inequalities discussed above, one for each odd train, in the order of their appearance on the circle (all four such inequalities are illustrated in Figure 2 ).
Then A and B contribute to each other's inequalities on alternating sides along this updating sequence/circle. That is, suppose the first inequality is A's and B goes into its LHS, then in the next inequality (could be either A's or B's) the contribution (either A to B's inequality or B to A's inequality) is on the RHS. Take our running example, for instance, the first inequality is due to the odd train marked by the sequence A 1 B 2 A 3 , and the second B 6 A 7 B 8 . Suppose 
B. Counter-Example for 3 Resources
The above theorem establishes that when there are only two resources, the FIP property holds, and consequently an NE exists. This holds for the general case of user-specific payoff functions. Below we show a counter-example that the FIP property does not necessarily hold for 3 resources/colors or more.
Example 1: Suppose we have three colors to assign, denoted by r (red), p (purple), and b (blue).
Consider a network topology shown in Figure 3 , where we will primarily focus on nodes A, B, C 
It is straightforward to verify the sufficiency of these conditions by following a node's sequence of changes. To complete this counter example, it remains to show that the above set of inequalities are feasible given appropriate choices of A x , B x , C x and D x , x ∈ {r, p, b}. There are many such choices; one example is A x = 5, B x = 3, C x = 7, D x = 1, for all x ∈ {r, p, b}. With such a choice, and substituting them into the earlier set of inequalities and through proper reordering, we obtain the following single chain of inequalities:
It should be obvious that this chain of inequalities can be easily satisfied by the right choices of non-increasing payoff functions.
It is easy to see how if we have more than 3 colors, this loop will still be an improving loop as long as the above inequalities hold. This means that for 3 colors or more the FIP property does not hold in general. Note that the updates in this example are not always best response updates.
V. EXISTENCE OF A PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we examine what graph properties will guarantee the existence of a NE. Specifically, we show that for a network congestion game defined on graphs that are (1) complete, (2) in the form of a tree, or (3) in the form of a loop, a pure strategy NE always exists with user-specific payoff functions that are non-increasing in the number of interfering users. Below we present these results in sequence. We will also give counter examples to show that a pure strategy NE does not generally exist in such a game when the network graph is directed or when the payoff functions are non-monotonic.
In addition to the results presented here, we believe a pure strategy NE exists in a general undirected graph (i.e., Theorem 3 holds for a general undirected graph, not just trees). Unfortunately, a formal proof remains elusive to this point. We continue to pursue this in our on-going research.
A. Existence of pure strategy NE on an undirected graph
Theorem 2: When the graph is complete, a NE always exists for the network congestion game defined on this graph. This theorem is trivially true. It is simply a direct consequence of known results on the standard CG: in a complete graph every node is every other node's neighbor, therefore a NCG reduces to the original CG, thus this result. Furthermore, for the same reason when the graph is complete the FIP property also holds.
We next show that a pure strategy NE exists when the underlying network graph is given by a tree. Proof: By assumption Γ N has a pure strategy NE denoted by σ = {σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ N }. Suppose Γ N is in such an NE. Now connect player N + 1 to a single player in G N . Call this player j and the resulting network G N +1 . This is illustrated in Figure 4 . Let player N + 1 select its best response strategy:
where n N +1 r is defined on the extended network G N +1 , and takes on the value of 1 or 0 depending on whether player j selects strategy r or not. We now consider three cases depending on j's strategy change in response to the change in network from G N to G N +1 .
Case 1: σ j = r o . In this case N + 1 selected a resource different from j's, so j has no incentive to change its strategy in response to the addition of player N + 1. In turn player N + 1 will remain in r o as this is its best response, and no other players are affected by this single-link network extension.
Thus the strategy profile (σ 1 , · · · , σ N , r o ) is a pure strategy NE for the game Γ N +1 .
Case 2: σ j = σ N +1 = r o , and player j's best response to the change from G N to G N +1 with player N + 1 selecting r o remains σ j = r o . That is, even with the additional interfering neighbor N + 1, the best choice for j remains r o . In this case again we reach a pure strategy NE for the game Γ N +1 with the same argument as in Case 1. In words, the gameΓ N is almost the same as the original game Γ N , the only difference being that the addition of player (N + 1) and its strategy r o is built into player j's modified payoff function.
By assumption of the lemma, this game with N players has a pure strategy NE and denote that byσ. Supposeσ is reached in the network G N with player (N + 1) fixed at σ N +1 = r o . If we havē σ j = r o , then obviously player (N + 1) has no incentive to change its strategy because as far as it is concerned its environment has not changed at all. In turn no player in G N will change its strategy because they are already in an NE with (N + 1) held at r o . Ifσ j = r o , then player (N + 1) has even less incentive to change its strategy because its payoff for using r o is no worse than before since j moved away with payoff functions being non-increasing, and at the same time its payoff for using any other resource is no better. Again r o is player (N + 1)'s best response.
In either case a new NE, the strategy profile (σ, r o ), is reached for the game Γ N +1 .
Remark 1:
Note that in the above lemma, the network G N itself does not have to be a tree. The lemma states that as long as a NE exists for one network, then by adding one more node through a single link, an NE exists in the new network.
Theorem 3:
A network congestion game defined over a tree network with non-increasing playerspecific payoff functions has at least one pure strategy NE.
Proof:
The proof is easily obtained by noting that any tree can be constructed by starting from a single node and adding one node (connected through a single link) at a time. Formally, we prove this by induction on N. Start with a single player indexed by 1. This game has a pure strategy NE, in which the player selects σ 1 = argmax r∈R g 1 r (1) for any payoff functions. Assume that any N-player game Γ N over a tree G N with any set of non-increasing payoff functions has at least one pure strategy NE. Any tree G N +1 may be constructed by adding one more leaf node to some other tree G N by connecting it to only one of the players in G N . Lemma 1 guarantees that such a formation will result in a game with at least one pure strategy NE.
Theorem 4:
If the network is in the form of a loop and user payoff functions are identical for a given resource, then there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, involving no more than 3 resources/colors.
Proof:
We know from Theorem 1 that when there are only 2 colors an NE always exists. Assume there are at least 3 colors to choose from. As payoff functions are non-user specific, we will suppress the superscript i in the function g Therefore in all cases we have shown an NE exists.
B. Counter Example of Non-monotonic Payoff Functions
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when the network graph is undirected but the payoff function is non-monotonic, even when they are non-user specific.
Example 2: Consider a 3-user, 2-channel network given in Figure 5 . The payoff functions have the following property
One example of this is when g 1 (1) = 2, g 1 (2) = 5, g 1 (3) = 3, g 2 (1) = 4, g 2 (2) = 6, g 2 (3) = 1. The game matrix corresponding to these payoff functions are given below. It is easy to verify that there exists no pure strategy NE. 
C. Counter Example of a Directed Graph
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when the network graph is directed.
Example 3:
Consider a 4-user, 3-channel network whose graph is given in Figure 6 . It can be shown that a pure strategy NE does not exist when the payoff functions are non-increasing and have the following property.
We do not include an example game matrix for brevity. We invite an interested reader to verify this example.
VI. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS ON USER PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
In this section we examine what properties on the user payoff functions will guarantee the existence of an NE. Specifically, we show that for general network graphs, an NE always exists if (1) there is one resource with a dominating payoff function (much larger than the others), or (2) different resources present the same type of payoff for users. Moreover, in the case of (2) the game has the FIP property. We note that case (2) is of particular practical interest and relevance, as this case in the context of spectrum sharing translates to evenly dividing a spectrum band into sub-bands, each providing users with the same bandwidth and data rate. Below we present and prove these results.
for all s ∈ 1, 2, · · · , R and all i ∈ I, then a Nash Equilibrium exists.
Here K d is the maximum node degree in the network, i.e., the maximum possible number of users sharing the same resource. In words, this theorem says that if there exists a resource whose payoff "dominates" all other resources, then an NE exists. This is a rather trivial result; an obvious NE is when all users share the dominating resource.
Theorem 6: For a general undirected network graph, if all resources have identical non-increasing payoff functions for any given user, i.e., for all r ∈ R and i ∈ I, we have g i r (n) = g i (n) for n = 1, 2, · · · , N and some non-increasing function g i (·), then there exists a Nash Equilibrium, and the game has the finite improvement property. Note that the payoffs can remain user-specific.
Proof: We prove this theorem by using a potential function argument.
Recall that user i's total payoff under the strategy profile σ is given by (here we have suppressed the subscript r since all resources are identical):
where σ i ∈ R since we have limited our attention to the case where each user can select only one resource at a time.
Now consider the following function defined on the strategy profile space:
where the indicator function 1(A) = 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. For a particular strategy profile σ this function φ is the sum of all pairs of users that are connected (neighbors of each other) and have chosen the same resource under this strategy profile. Viewed in a graph, this function is the total number of edges connecting nodes with the same color.
We see that every time user i improves its payoff by switching from strategy σ i to σ ′ i , and reducing n i (σ −i , σ i ) to n i (σ −i , σ ′ i ) (g i is a non-increasing function), the value of φ() strictly decreases accordingly 7 . As this function is bounded from below, this means that in this case the game has the FIP property so this process eventually converges to a fixed point which is a Nash Equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have considered an extension to the classical definition of congestion games by allowing resources to be reused among non-interfering users. This is a much more appropriate model to use in the context of wireless networks and spectrum sharing where due to decay of wireless signals over a distance, spatial reuse is frequently exploited to increase spectrum utilization.
The resulting game, congestion game with resource reuse, is a generalization to the original congestion game. We have shown that when there are only two resources and users can only use one at a time, then the game has the finite improvement property; the same is shown to be false in general when there are three or more resources. We further showed a number of conditions on the network graph as well as the user payoff functions under which the game has an NE. Perhaps most relevant to spectrum sharing is the result that when all resources present the same payoff to users (e.g., all channels are of the same bandwidth and data rate for all users), then the game has the finite improvement property and an NE exists. [10] S. Adlakha, R. Johari, and A. Goldsmith, "Competition in wireless systems via Bayesian interference games," submitted for publication, 2008.
[11] B. Babadi and V. Tarokh, "A distributed dynamic frequency allocation algorithm," submitted for publication, 2008. 
